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~~TOP SECRET~~**SUMMARY****SOVIET UNION**

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~~TOP SECRET~~**SOVIET UNION**✓ 1. Comment on Khrushchev's rising prestige:

Recent indications of the increasing public prestige and apparent influence of Khrushchev are contrary to the concept of collective leadership adopted after Stalin's death and reflect adversely on Malenkov's status as head of party and state. There have been some signs of policy differences between the two.

Railway Minister Beshchev and party presidium member Kaganovich, in recent speeches, accorded increased prominence to Party Secretary Khrushchev at Malenkov's expense.

Speeches delivered on 22 May by Ukrainian first secretary Kirichenko and two other prominent delegates to the tercentenary celebration of the unification of the Ukraine with Russia contained special tributes to Khrushchev, but no speaker is known to have mentioned Malenkov. Kirichenko included Khrushchev in the same category with Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, and others. Plaudits for Khrushchev were included, somewhat out of context, in the speeches by the head of the Kazakh delegation and the Uzbek representative.

Under these circumstances, Malenkov might be expected in the near future to try to counter this trend; its continuation could only suggest that Khrushchev's position and influence is greater than Malenkov's.

FAR EAST✓ 2. Concentration of Chinese Communist vessels suggests intensification of offshore islands campaign:

sighted a concentration of 21 Chinese Communist LST's at Shanghai on 8 May.

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[redacted] saw a number of gunboats and 1,000 junks 15 miles north of Kinmen Island, one of the four small islands within 20 miles of the Tachens which were occupied by the Communists on 15-16 May.

Comment: The Peiping regime is believed to have 30 LST's, half of which are assigned to the navy. The rest are normally used for coastal merchant shipping.

The massing of troop-carrying vessels in the coastal waters suggests that the Chinese Communists will intensify their current campaign against the offshore islands. While an attack on the Tachens is within Communist capabilities, Peiping may attempt instead to take other islands to the south in an effort to cut supply lines from Formosa and thus to isolate the Tachen garrison.

SOUTHEAST ASIA


- ✓ 3. [redacted] no heavy attack on Tonkin delta before September:

[redacted] Saigon estimates that there will be no large attack on the Tonkin delta before September. [redacted] there is no indication of a major supply build-up of the size necessary for an all-out attack. Enemy units within the delta, however, are expected to continue their efforts to cut French supply lines in an attempt to strangle Hanoi.

[redacted]

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The Viet Minh, which has the initiative, may delay a decision on an all-out assault until it has redeployed its major units and then assessed French strength and morale.

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4.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. Communist group in Iraq attracts non-Communist electoral candidates:



Iraq's Communist-inspired National Front, especially organized for the elections to be held on 9 June, has been working hard to

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[redacted] attract as many candidates as possible and has been particularly successful in winning over dissatisfied non-Communist candidates,

[redacted]

As of 21 May, the Front was backing 26 of the 260 candidates registered so far--13 members of the National Democratic Party, 7 members of the Istiqlal and 6 independents. Additional independents, particularly disgruntled members of Saleh Jabr's basically pro-Western UMMA party, are expected to side with the Front; and some observers report that the Front is attracting many younger people not affiliated with any party.

Comment: The Front has no chance of winning the elections, which will probably be dominated by Iraq's traditional pro-Western ruling group. Nevertheless, the Communists' success in organizing this Front testifies to their continuing strength and ability to exploit and heighten the already strong anti-Westernism in Iraq. Even a small Communist-controlled parliamentary clique could further arouse the populace against Iraq's contemplated adherence to the Turkish-Pakistani pact.

WESTERN EUROPE

6. Ambassador Luce fears "explosion" in Italy over Trieste:

[redacted] Ambassador Luce reports from Rome that "the Trieste situation can explode here at any hour" unless the Italian government can be convinced that the London talks, and consequently a Trieste solution, have not "hopelessly foundered on the rocks of Tito's intransigency."

Comment: The Italians, already discouraged by the failure to implement the 8 October declaration on Trieste, have recently been aroused by Yugoslav statements to the press regarding new plans for a settlement which seem in Italian eyes to favor Yugoslav claims. A setback on Trieste might furnish Premier Scelba's opponents the opportunity they seek to overthrow him.

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